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CASE NO. 96-312322-CV
JUDGE RONALD SUSTER

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE
OR ALTERNATIVELY TO DENY
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

)

Defendant

)

Now comes the Plaintiff, through counsel, and hereby moves this Court, pursuant
to Rule 12(F) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, to strike Defendant's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the alternative, to deny said Motion for the reason that
the arguments contained in said Motion have been previously briefed and presented to
this Court and rejected, are clearly redundant and have no merit. The State of Ohio, while
unhappy with this Court's prior rulings on the very same arguments, is simply not content
to avail itself of an appropriate appellate remedy to challenge this Court's rulings, but
~-

·-·---.........,

C_ arrogantly Jeels'i it has the privilege to continue to repeatedly raise the same exact
arguments, albeit with different headings, and thereby abuse the administration of justice
and the Rules of Civil Procedure by causing more unnecessary delays and costs with
respect to this case, as more fully briefed in the attached Brief hereto.

Respectfully submitted,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs Motion to Strike or Alternatively to Deny
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings has been

t+a14~aeldrf&'ered, this ::< 7

day of _ _
P?_~---r---' 1997, to Patrick Murphy, Esq. and Marilyn Cassidy, Esq.,
Assistant Cuyahoga County Prosecutors, at their office, Justice Center, 1200 Ontario
Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113.

TER~i-V~
Attorney for Plaintiff
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BRIEF

Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is the latest installation of the
State's effort to prevent the matter of Dr. Sam Sheppard's wrongful imprisonment claim
from being heard on the merits. Two previous Motions to Dismiss, raising the same
arguments, were rejected on January 13, 1997. These previous Motions, and responses
thereto, were extensively researched, briefed, and considered, and the case clearly was
headed for a trial. Indeed, the Court met with undersigned counsel and First Assistant
Prosecutor Carmen Marino (thought to represent the State of Ohio) on March 10, 1997.
A timetable for resolving evidentiary issues was agreed upon and the Court scheduled
a hearing for May 9, 1997 in order to focus on outstanding evidence questions.

By

agreement of the parties, the trial on the merits was scheduled for July 14, 1997. Nothing
was mentioned about any further attempts to block a trial in this case, as that question
had been moot for some time.
Then, without regard to any of the ground rules mutually previously agreed to by
the Court and counsel, the State, represented by other members of the Prosecutor's
Office (without Mr. Marino on the pleadings) filed its Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings one day before the May 9th hearing. They also conveniently failed to notify
or serve a copy of their eleventh hour Motion on counsel for the Plaintiff. The Court was
gracious in allowing its copy to be reviewed as Plaintiffs counsel walked into the
courtroom for the hearing. As a result of this desperate attempt to re-assert previously
rejected arguments, the original purpose of the scheduled hearing was sabotaged and
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then indefinitely delayed because the Court was placed in a position of having to consider
the Motion, and afford an opportunity to Plaintiff to respond.
Such tactics cannot be tolerated by the Court. A litigant must not be permitted to
continue to file the same Motions and raise the same arguments after unequivocal
adverse rulings. This Court has the discretion, pursuant to Rule 12(F) to strike "from any
pleading any insufficient claim or defense or any redundant (emphasis added),
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." The State's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings is clearly redundant.
In the August, 1996 Motion to Dismiss (overruled on January 13, 1997), the State
raised !aches, statute of limitations, standing, abatement, and only live individuals
can sue.

In the May, 1997, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the State raised

laches, statute of limitations, standing, abatement, and only live individuals can
sue. No new law, facts or grounds were stated, other than the concept of jurisdiction was
thrown in. However, the jurisdiction argument was based upon the recycling of the original
standing argument - in other words, that an estate has no authority to bring an action in
wrongful imprisonment. The two Motions are identical almost to the word, and the State
makes no serious attempt to camouflage the use of a word processor to spit out the same
brief.
The appropriate response of this Court is to strike the pleading.

The State's

attitude is essentially - "we don't like your ruling, so we'll file again and again until you get
the point." This mentality is dangerous and disrespectful to the Court, and must not be
tolerated. And then when one considers that the Motion was filed to thwart the Court's
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agenda for May 9, 1997, one begins to wonder if the State Ohio is dealing with a full
deck.
To the extent that a response is necessary, Plaintiff would incorporate all
arguments previously raised in its earlier responses. However, since the issues were
previously briefed, Plaintiff has discovered a case where both the Common Pleas Court
and the Court of Claims recognized that a wrongful imprisonment claim survives the death
of the individual and can be brought by the estate. In Eva Celestino, Administrator of the
Estate of Juan A. Celestino v. State of Ohio, (Court of Common Pleas, Sandusky County
No. 94CV13; Court of Claims No. 95-127'70), the issue of abatement was raised in a
Motion to Dismiss and rejected. The State failed to perfect an appeal and an action
pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §2743.48 was filed on behalf of the estate in the Court
of Claims. The Ohio Attorney General eventually stipulated to a judgment. See attached
records from this case.
The central argument of the State is that the wrongful imprisonment remedy is only
available to live people, and is extinguished once the victim of a wrongful imprisonment
dies. Apparently, even the Attorney General's Office has given up on that argument and
had no problem consenting to the payment of damages to the Estate of Juan A.
Celestino. It is paramount under Ohio jurisprudence that, except for very narrowly defined
actions specified in the survivor statute, Ohio Revised Code §2305.21, actions, whether
by statutory remedy, or common law, survive.

The State is hung up on the word

"individual" and therefore assumes, simplistically and without any legal authority, that it
means the action does not survive. But the analysis does not end with the dictionary
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definition of "person" or "individual"; it must be viewed in the context of the long tradition
in Ohio in favor of remedies surviving the death of the victim, unless the legislature
specifically identifies an action that does not survive. And to be sure, the legislature has
not removed the wrongful imprisonment remedy from those actions that survive, and it
is presumptuous for the State to attempt to second guess the legislative intent in this
area.
The remaining arguments advanced by the State such as !aches and statute of
limitations are completely devoid of merit, as the statutory scheme for the wrongful
imprisonment remedy specifically sets forth the applicable time limits - two years to file
in the Court of Claims after a Common Pleas Court's determination of wrongful
imprisonment.

There is no time limitation as to when a party may seek such

determination. These issues were briefed in Plaintiffs previous Brief in Response to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, attached hereto.
For all the above reasons, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
should be stricken and/or denied.
Respectfully submitted,
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